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RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
Business Judgment Dismissal of
Shareholder Derivative Suits by Board
Litigation Committees: An Expanded Role
for the Courts
I. INTRODUCTION
The shareholder derivative suit has proved to be a useful and
essential legal mechanism for corporation shareholders to deter
and redress harm to the corporation caused by director malfea-
sance.' Recently, however, some courts have dismissed shareholder
derivative suits before a trial on the merits by offensively applying
the business judgment rule.2 Traditionally, the business judgment
rule served merely as a defense that insulated directors from per-
sonal liability on the merits of a shareholder suit.3 In these recent
cases, however, some courts have expanded the business judgment
rule to allow corporation boards to terminate shareholder deriva-
tive suits against fellow directors.4 In jurisdictions that sanction
this new offensive application of the business judgment rule, the
board of directors of a corporation may obtain dismissal of a share-
holder derivative suit when the suit is not in the corporation's best
interests. The United States Supreme Court in Burks v. Lasker5
authorized the offensive use of the business judgment rule to dis-
miss derivative actions brought under federal law. Nevertheless,
the Court held that state law was the "first place one must look to
determine the powers of corporate directors" to employ the busi-
1. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Brendle v.
Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); N. LArrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §
115, at 457 (2d ed. 1971); Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
74, 77-82 (1967).
2. See notes 76-136 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 53-54 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 76-136 infra and accompanying text.
5. 441 U.S. 471 (1979). See notes 76-101 infra and accompanying text.
6. 441 U.S. at 478.
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ness judgment rule to dismiss derivative actions.
Recently, in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado" the Delaware Su-
preme Court decided the question whether a board of directors
could, under state law, terminate a shareholder derivative suit. The
court held that a corporation's board of directors, under proper cir-
cumstances, can terminate a shareholder derivative suit when the
suit is not in the corporation's best interests.' Since Delaware is a
very popular domicile for national corporations, Zapata is certain
to "become the model for derivative suit dismissal decisions in
other states as well as in federal courts applying Delaware and
other state laws."10 This Recent Development examines the legal
background of the shareholder derivative suit and the business
judgment rule and then traces the evolution of the offensive use of
the business judgment rule in board of director terminations of
stockholder derivative actions. After examining other derivative
suit dismissal decisions, the Recent Development analyzes whether
Zapata adequately balances the competing interests of the share-
holder and the corporate board. Finally, the Recent Development
discusses the potential effect of Zapata on future litigation.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Nature and Effect of the Shareholder Derivative Suit
1. Origin and Characteristics of the Derivative Suit
The shareholder derivative suit originated in equity" to en-
able a shareholder to enforce a corporate right or claim in order to
protect his ownership interest in the corporation. 2 A shareholder's
basis for a derivative suit,18 then, is a harm to the corporation, not
harm to the individual shareholder. 14 Because a derivative action
7. Id. at 478-80.
8. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
9. Id. at 788.
10. Olson, Delaware Court Addresses Business Judgment Rule, Legal Times of Wash-
ington, June 8, 1981, at 15, col. 1, at 19, col. 3.
11. For a more detailed discussion of the origins of the shareholder derivative suit, see
Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980
(1957).
12. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISES § 358, at 749 (2d ed. 1970).
13. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of
the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96, 96 n.1 (1980). "The derivative suit is to be distin-
guished from the representative suit, in which the shareholder complains of an injury...
directly to himself and other shareholders." Id.
14. See H. HENN, supra note 12, § 358, at 750. "In this sense, the derivative action is
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asserts a right on behalf of the corporation, rather than a right on
behalf of the individual shareholders, any judgment usually15 goes
to the corporation.16 Moreover, since a derivative suit is based on a
corporate claim, it is usually permitted only when the corporation
for some reason chooses not to assert the cause of action itself.
17
Thus, if all the conditions are met,18 a shareholder may use the
derivative suit to pursue a legal claim that the corporation's board
of directors had chosen to forego.
Although the shareholder's derivative suit has had a major ef-
fect on corporate governance, the effect has not been to increase
shareholder power in decisionmaking. Rather, the derivative suit
has become the minority shareholder's major remedy against man-
agement or board misconduct.1 9 The shareholder's derivative suit
has become most important when the harm to the corporation was
perpetrated by insiders20 -either directors or officers.2  In Brendle
v. Smith2 2 the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York discussed the regulatory effect of the shareholder deriv-
ative suit on corporate governance:
[T]hey have accomplished much in policing the corporate system especially
in protecting the corporate ownership as against corporate management.
They have educated corporate directors in the principles of fiduciary respon-
sibility and undivided loyalty .... encouraged faith in the wisdom of full
disclosure to stockholders ... [and] discouraged membership on boards by
persons not truly interested in the corporation.. . . The measure of effective-
ness of the stockholder's derivative suit cannot be taken by a computation of
the money recovery in the litigated cases. The minatory effect of such actions
has undoubtedly prevented diversion of large amounts from stockholders to
unique, for the plaintiff-shareholder does not sue for his own direct benefit or in his own
direct right but rather as a guardian ad litem for the corporation." Id.
15. For an enumeration of the circumstances in which a plaintiff-shareholder may
share in the recovery, see id. § 373, at 787-88.
16. Id. § 376, at 787.
17. Id. § 360, at 756.
18. See notes 35-39 infra and accompanying text.
19. N. LATTIN, supra note 1, § 115, at 457. See also Dykstra, supra note 1.
20. See Dykstra, supra note 1, at 77-82. See also H. HENN, supra note 12, § 358 at 751.
21. The need for the derivative suit is greatest in cases when the harm was allegedly
perpetrated by officers or directors, because they can prevent the corporation from asserting
a direct cause of action against themselves. If the insider misconduct impaired the market
value of the stock, then individual or representative shareholder actions would be available.
Unfortunately, however, redress in the form of individual or representative shareholder ac-
tions would result in an unnecessary multiplicity of suits, an impairment of capital, or both.
See H. HENN, supra note 12, § 358, at 751.
Although its most important use is as a remedy for harm committed by insiders, the
shareholder derivative suit may also be used to redress a "wrong to the corporation perpe-
trated by ... outsiders." Id.





As the Brendle court pointed out, the shareholder derivative
suit serves several beneficial functions. First, the availability of the
shareholder derivative suit deters corporate misconduct. 4 Second,
the derivative suit legitimizes the corporate governance system by
providing a means for shareholders to redress harm to the corpora-
tion perpetrated by those in control.25 In other words, the deriva-
tive suit serves as an accountability mechanism. Last, the deriva-
tive suit fosters judicial economy because it allows a single
shareholder to bring an action to obtain complete relief for the cor-
poration as a whole.2"
The most distinguishing characteristic of a derivative action is
its dual nature. A shareholder derivative suit basically comprises
two suits. 28 The first suit compels the corporation to sue on its own
behalf. The second suit, which is the underlying cause of action,
seeks redress for the corporation against the real defendants. Be-
cause of the dual nature of the derivative suit, the corporation
plays two roles in derivative litigation.2 On the one hand, the cor-
poration is a nominal party defendant because of its refusal to sue.
In some situations the corporation may defend the board's decision
to refrain from suit because it is not in the corporation's best inter-
ests. If the court agrees with the board's decision, it will dismiss
the derivative suit. On the other hand, the corporation is the real
party plaintiff if the court does not dismiss the derivative suit be-
cause the suit seeks redress for a harm to the corporation.3
2. Restrictions on Shareholder Derivative Suits
While the shareholder derivative suit serves several useful
purposes, it has also been a vehicle for abuse. The abuses include
23. Id. at 525-26.
24. See Dent, supra note 13, at 144.
25. Id.
26. See note 21 supra.
27. See W. FLETCHER, 13 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5946
(rev. perm. ed. 1980).
28. Id.
The cause of action when a stockholder sues is dual in composition, consisting of
the basic cause of action, which pertains to the corporation and on which it might have
sued, and the derivative cause of action, pertaining to the stockholder, consisting in the
fact that the corporation will not or cannot sue for its own protection. Both elements
are essential.
Id. See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).
29. See H. HENN, supra note 12, § 358, at 750; 73 HARv. L. REV. 746, 748 (1960).
30. See H. HENN, supra note 12, § 358, at 750; 73 HARV. L. REV., supra note 29, at 750.
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the exposure of the corporation to strike suits,3 1 the use of manu-
factured pleadings to gain discovery for the purpose of finding a
claim to assert,32 and the increased potential for private settle-
ments between the corporation and the plaintiffs In addition to
these abuses, derivative litigation is "often protracted, time-con-
suming for corporate management, and very expensive. '34 More-
over, the increased use of the derivative suit tends to shift corpo-
rate governance from the centralized board of directors to the
shareholders, or even to one shareholder.
Some jurisdictions have constructed barriers to the bringing of
shareholder derivative suits to eliminate the perceived problems
that accompany these suits. Among these obstacles are various
stock ownership requirements, including ownership of stock at the
commencement of the suit, during the pendency of the suit, and at
the time of the alleged harm to the corporation.35 Some jurisdic-
tions require the plaintiff-shareholder to post security for ex-
penses, including attorney's fees. 6 In addition, some jurisdictions
impose special statutes of limitations.3 7
The most important obstacle facing the shareholder-plaintiff
in a derivative action is the requirement that he make a demand
on the board of directors to bring suit to remedy the alleged
harm,3 8 or demonstrate that a demand on the board would be fu-
31. H. HENN, supra note 12, § 358, at 752 n.22. Black's Law Dictionary defines a strike
suit as a "[s]hareholder derivative action begun with hope of winning large attorney fees or
private settlements, and no intention of benefiting corporation on behalf of which suit is
theoretically brought." BLACK'S LAW DicTioNARY 1276 (5th ed. 1979). One commentator
claims that this "definition is overly broad and raises the spectre of evils that may not
exist." Kim, The Demand on Directors Requirement and the Business Judgment Rule in
the Shareholder Derivative Suit: An Alternative Framework, 6 J. CoRP. L. 511, 525 (1981).
Hence, a more limited definition may be more appropriate. A "strike suit, therefore, would
be a suit commenced for the purpose of obtaining a private settlement or to annoy or em-
barrass the defendants." Id. at 526. Under either definition, the strike suit produces no
benefit to society and should be prevented.
32. See Dent, supra note 13, at 140-42.
33. See H. HENN, supra note 12, § 358, at 752.
34. Id.
35. Id. §§ 361-363.
36. Id. § 372.
37. Id. § 357.
38. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881); H. HENN, supra note 12, §§
364-366. The basis for the requirement of the demand on the board is found in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.1, which requires the shareholder to "allege with particularity the ef-
forts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or
comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons
for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
1982]
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tile.3 9 Several justifications exist for the demand requirement.
First, since the shareholder's claim is based on a corporate claim,
the corporation is the real party in interest.40 Second, the demand
requirement offers corporate management an opportunity to rem-
edy the matter without the expense, publicity, and delay of litiga-
tion.41 Last, the demand requirement allows the corporation's
board of directors to control the litigation of an action that was
brought on the corporation's behalf in the first place, and thereby
to afford the directors the opportunity to conduct the corporation's
affairs.4 2 Thus, the underlying rationale for the demand require-
ment is to ensure that the plaintiff-shareholder has exhausted all
intracorporate remedies.43
Notwithstanding the compelling reasons for requiring a plain-
tiff-shareholder to make a demand on the corporation's board of
directors, the demand requirement is excused in situations "where
hostility on the part of the directors makes such a demand fu-
tile.' '44 Courts have excused demand when the alleged wrongdoers
constituted a majority of the board,45 when the wrongdoers con-
trolled the board,46 and when the board approved the alleged
wrongful transaction.47 Thus, while the demand requirement en-
sures that the shareholder has attempted to obtain relief for the
corporation through the normal corporate governance system, judi-
cial waiver of the demand requirement when the board is biased
allows the shareholder to obtain relief for the corporation when the
internal corporate governance system malfunctions.
Once the shareholder-plaintiff makes demand on the board,
the board must decide whether or not to take over the claim. A
refusal to sue by the board, however, may not end the litigation.
39. FaD. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
40. See 73 HARv. L. REV., supra note 29. See also H. HENN, supra note 12, § 358, at
750.
41. See Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative
Actions, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 168, 171 (1976).
42. Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975).
43. H. HENN, supra note 12, § 364. See also 73 HARv. L. REv., supra note 29, at 748-
49. The demand requirement also serves to notify the directors of the alleged cause of ac-
tion, notify the shareholders who can remedy the problem by voting out the directors, and
give the board an opportunity to settle the dispute without litigation and foster judicial
economy. Id.
44. H. HENN, supra note 12, § 365, at 771.
45. See, e.g., Reed v. Norman, 48 Cal. 2d 338, 309 P.2d 809 (1957).
46. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 841 (1964).
47. See American Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 262 Ala. 560, 80 So. 2d 487 (1954).
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Most courts conclude "that the board's refusal to sue falls within
the business judgment rule"48 and will dismiss the derivative suit.
Courts generally will not dismiss when the shareholder can
"demonstrate that the board's decision not to sue was ultra vires,
•... [fraudulent], in bad faith, [or] in breach of trust, 4 9 or that
the board was involved in the wrongdoing.8 0 In addition, courts
generally will not dismiss a derivative suit that names a majority of
directors as defendants. 51 Since a shareholder can bypass the de-
mand requirement and override a board decision not to sue when a
majority of the directors are defendants, plaintiff-shareholders in-
variably name the entire board of directors as defendants.52
Even if the court has excused demand, the corporation may
still move for dismissal of the derivative action on the ground that
the suit is not in the corporation's best interest. Whether the court
will dismiss the suit on this motion usually depends upon the ap-
plicability of the business judgment rule to the facts of the case.
B. The Applicability of the Business Judgment Rule in the
Context of the Shareholder Derivative Suit
1. The Traditional Business Judgment Rule
The courts developed the business judgment rule to encourage
the resolution of corporate disputes within the corporate structure
and to bolster state statutes that favored the centralization of cor-
porate governance in the board.53 This rule insulates officers and
directors from personal liability for mistakes of judgment made in
good faith.54 The rule stems from the notion that a court should
not substitute its judgment for the board's judgment on business
matters.55 Nevertheless, the business judgment rule does not com-
pletely absolve directors from personal liability for their acts. If
the directors do not in fact exercise their judgment independently,
in good faith, and with due care, then courts will not insulate them
48. See Dent, supra note 13, at 100. See also notes 53-136 infra and accompanying
text.
49. Dent, supra note 13, at 102.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 105.
52. Id. See also Kim, supra note 31, at 514; Note, The Business Judgment Rule in
Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 630 n.147 (1980).
53. Estes, Corporate Governance in the Courts, HARV. Bus. REV., Jul.-Aug. 1980, at
50.
54. L. SODERQUIST, CORPORATIONS: A PROBLEM APPROACH 325 (1979).




2. The Use of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder
Derivative Suits
With the exception of the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in
Zapata,57 courts generally treat board decisions on whether to pur-
sue shareholder derivative suits the same as they treat other busi-
ness decisions. 8 If a board makes a good faith decision to refrain
from pursuing a legal claim, then the courts will apply the business
judgment rule and not interfere with the decision.5 9 For example,
in Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co. 0 the United
States Supreme Court stated,
The directors may sometimes properly waive a legal right vested in the corpo-
ration in the belief that its best interests will be promoted by not insisting on
such right. They may regard the expense of enforcing the right or the further-
ance of the general business of the corporation in determining whether to
waive or insist upon the right.6 1
The Supreme Court extended the applicability of the business
judgment rule to the corporation's motion to dismiss a shareholder
derivative suit in United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co.6 In United Copper the Court used the business judg-
ment rule to protect the board's good faith decision's to dismiss a
shareholder derivative suit which alleged that the directors vio-
lated antitrust laws. 4 According to one court, "the essence of the
business judgment rule in this context is that directors may freely
find that certain meritorious actions are not in the corporation's
best interests to pursue."6 5 Thus, the business judgment rule
evolved from a defensive measure shielding directors from personal
56. Id.
57. See notes 159-82 infra and accompanying text.
58. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917). The
Court found that "[w]hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause
of action for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal man-
agement and is left to the discretion of the directors . . . ." Id.
59. Id. "Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation,
except where the directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where
they stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment ......
Id.
60. 187 U.S. 455 (1903).
61. Id. at 463.
62. 244 U.S. 261 (1917). See notes 58-59 supra.
63. 244 U.S. at 264.
64. Id. at 262-63.
65. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (emphasis in original).
See notes 146-50 infra and accompanying text.
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liability into an offensive weapon permitting directors to terminate
shareholder derivative suits.6 6 The offensive use of the busi-
ness judgment rule confers considerable powers on the board to
terminate derivative litigation, regardless of the merits, and is
conditioned only on the board's exercise of good faith and
independence.
67
Although the board usually has considerable control over de-
rivative litigation, courts will limit this control by refusing to apply
the business judgment rule when strong evidence demonstrates
that the board is biased against the suit.6 8 Thus, in cases in which
the shareholder names some or all of the directors as defendants,
the board likely would be biased and, therefore, would loose its
authority over the disposition of the suit. In response to this prob-
lem, many corporate boards have delegated to special litigation
committees the authority to decide whether to pursue the deriva-
tive action.6 9
The special litigation committees are usually composed of dis-
interested directors, recently appointed outside directors, eminent
professors, prominent former judges, and outside counsel.0 In
their investigation of the lawsuit the committees generally consider
the cost of litigation, the possibility of interrupting business and
undermining personnel morale, the nature and effect on the corpo-
ration of the alleged harm, and the likelihood of any recovery. Af-
ter weighing these considerations, the committee decides whether
continuation of the suit is in the best interests of the corporation.
The committee then recommends that the corporation either move
for dismissal or pursue the suit. Not surprisingly, in all reported
cases the litigation committees have recommended termination of
the derivative suit on the ground that the suit does not serve the
best interests of the corporation. 1
At least one commentator has claimed that the practice of ap-
66. See Comment, Offensive Application of the Business Judgment Rule to Termi-
nate Nonfrivolous Derivative Actions: Should the Courts Guard the Guards?, 12 Tax.
TECH. L. REv. 635, 639-40 (1981).
67. See Johnson & Osborne, The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigious
Society, 15 VA. U.L. REv. 49, 52-56 (1980).
68. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
69. See Estes, supra note 53, at 52. In these cases most corporate boards delegate full
authority over the disposition of the suit to the committee. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) ("The Committee's determination was stated to be 'fi-
nal, . . . not ... subject to review by the Board of Directors and ... in all respects ...
binding upon the Corporation.' ").
70. See notes 196 & 205 infra.
71. Dent, supra note 13, at 109 n.70.
1982]
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pointing a special litigation committee to investigate shareholder
derivative actions may lead to "the demise of the derivative suit":
7 2
When faced with a derivative suit, defendant directors will invariably request
an investigation and decision by some fellow directors as to whether the suit
is in the best interests of the corporation. The defendants have nothing to
lose in so doing-at worst, the nonimplicated directors will decide to take
over the suit, or to take a neutral stance toward the suit, leaving thie defen-
dants no worse off than when they started. More important, the prospect of
such a decision is minimal; almost invariably, the directors charged with the
decision decide to oppose the suit. In most cases, this opposition will result in
dismissal of the suit. ... 73
Conflicting interests must be balanced in determining the ex-
tent to which special litigation committees should be permitted to
seek the dismissal of derivative suits. On the one hand, if corpora-
tions can consistently terminate bona fide derivative actions
through "the use of the committee mechanism, the derivative suit
will lose much, if not all, of its generally-recognized effectiveness as
an intra-corporate means of policing boards of directors."7 ' On the
other hand, if corporations are unable to terminate trivial, merit-
less, or harmful litigation merely because plaintiffs named direc-
tors as defendants, then the derivative suit could prove deleterious
to the corporation. 5
C. The Offensive Use of the Business Judgment Rule to
Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits
1. The Test Announced in Burks v. Lasker
In Burks v. Lasker7 8 the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished the general framework for determining whether a corpora-
tion's litigation committee could employ the business judgment
rule to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit. In Burks two stock-
holders of an investment company 7 brought a derivative suit
against the corporation's investment adviser and half of the board
of directors. In 1969 the company purchased $20 million of Penn
Central commercial paper.78 Six months after the purchase, Penn
Central filed for a bankruptcy reorganization, and, as a result of
72. Id. at 109.
73. Id. (footnotes omitted).
74. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981).
75. See id. at 786-87; Olson, supra note 10.
76. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
77. The investment company was domiciled in Delaware. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d
1208, 1210 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
78. 441 U.S. at 473-74.
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the bankruptcy, the notes were not paid.7 9 The shareholders
claimed that the directors breached their fiduciary duties to the
corporation by improvidently purchasing the notes8 0 In addition,
the shareholders alleged violations of the Investment Company Act
of 194081 and the Investment Adviser Act of 1940.82 The corpora-
tion's entire board of directors delegated the authority to decide
whether to pursue the lawsuit to a special committee, which con-
sisted of the five remaining nondefendant directors.83 After investi-
gating the shareholders' claims for five months, the committee rec-
ommended that the corporation move for dismissal of the
derivative suit on the ground that the lawsuit was contrary to the
corporation's best interests.
8 4
The district court held that the business judgment rule is ap-
plicable to the committee's decision to dismiss the derivative suit. 5
Consequently, the district court granted the corporation's motion
for summary judgment.88 The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed, finding that under the federal statutes the corpora-
tion had no authority to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit not-
withstanding the committee's independence and good faith.
87
Moreover, the Second Circuit found that the business judgment
rule is never applicable to litigation committee decisions on share-
holder derivative suits.88 The court reasoned that a litigation com-
mittee composed of nondefendant directors could never be unbi-
ased and independent when evaluating -whether to continue
derivative litigation brought against other directors:
It is asking too much of human nature to expect that the [special litigation
committee of nondefendant directors] will view with the necessary objectivity
the actions of their colleagues in a situation where an adverse decision would
be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the individuals
concerned.89
79. Id. at 474 n.3.
80. Id. at 473-74.
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976).
82. Id. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1976).
83. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1209-10 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
84. The committee was very diligent in undertaking its investigation. The committee
met in private and retained former chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Stanley
H. Fuld, as special counsel. Id.
85. Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.
1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
86. Id. at 853.





Disapproving the structural bias"° argument advanced by the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court reversed. 1 The Court held
that federal courts should apply the state law that governs the au-
thority of independent directors to discontinue derivative suits un-
less there is evidence of bias within the board.2 Since at the time
of Burks, all state courts employed a business judgment rule analy-
sis,"3 the Supreme Court's decision in effect directed federal courts
to determine under the law of the appropriate state whether the
particular corporate board may use the business judgment rule to
dismiss derivative actions. The Court held that if state law permits
business judgment dismissal of the derivative suit, then federal
courts must dismiss the action unless the dismissal controverts
federal policy. '4 The Court rejected the Second Circuit's structural
bias argument: "[L]ack of impartiality may or may not be true as a
matter of fact in individual cases. . ., [but] it is not a conclusion
of law. . . . 11 Since the lower courts had not considered state law,
the Court remanded the case for further evaluation in light of Del-
aware law. 6  *
In Burks the Supreme Court announced a two-step test for
federal courts to follow in evaluating a corporation's motion to dis-
miss a derivative suit. First, the court examines whether the appli-
cable state law permits independent directors to dismiss a deriva-
tive action on the basis of the business judgment rule.9 7 Second, if
the relevant state law permits dismissal of the derivative suit, then
the court determines whether dismissal of the suit would conflict
with federal policy." If dismissal of the suit conflicts with federal
policy, then the suit will not be dismissed; if no such conflict exists,
the suit will be dismissed. Most cases since Burks have applied the
business judgment rule in dismissing shareholder derivative suits.9
These cases generally fall into two categories-suits alleging illegal
foreign payments 0 0 and suits alleging breaches of fiduciary duty
90. For a discussion approving of the court of appeals' structural bias argument, see
Note, supra note 52.
91. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979).
92. Id. at 485 n.15.
93. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
94. 441 U.S. at 486.
95. Id. at 485 n.15.
96. Id. at 486.
97. Id. at 478, 480.
98. Id. at 480-81.
99. See notes 102-36 infra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 102-14 infra and accompanying text.
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and federal securities violations. 10 1 Most of the cases were brought
in federal courts and were decided under the Burks v. Lasker
guidelines.
2. Derivative Suits Alleging Illegal Foreign Payments
Several post-Burks derivative suits arose in the context of
questionable foreign payments. 102 For example, in Auerbach v.
Bennett'03 shareholders alleged that directors of General Tele-
phone and Electronics Corporation breached their fiduciary duty
to the corporation by making and authorizing bribes and kickbacks
to foreigners.1 0 4  A special litigation committee of three
nondefendant directors 0 5 determined that the suit was not in the
corporation's best interests and recommended dismissal.106 The
New York Court of Appeals strictly applied the business judgment
rule and upheld the lower court's entry of summary judgment.10 7
Limiting its review to the independence of the committee,108 the
court noted, "[Clourts cannot inquire as to which factors were con-
sidered by that committee or the relative weight accorded them in
reaching that substantive decision.. . . To permit judicial probing
of such issues would be to emasculate the business judgment
doctrine."'' 09
In Abbey v. Control Data Corp.10 a shareholder sued to com-
pel certain officers and directors of the corporation to reimburse
the corporation for substantial penalties levied on it as a result of
101. See notes 115-36 infra and accompanying text.
102. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Ben-
nett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
103. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
104. Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923. For an extensive review of the
facts of Auerbach, see 25 VILL. L. REv. 551 (1980).
105. 47 N.Y.2d at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 -N.Y.S.2d at 923. The three directors
joined the board after the questionable payments had been made.
106. Id. at 625-26, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923-24. The committee cited
several reasons to support terminating the derivative suit: (1) the directors had not violated
their duty of care; (2) the directors did not personally profit; (3) the continuation of the suit
would detrimentally divert corporate resources; (4) the cost of litigation was prohibitive in
view of the probability of success; and (5) the suit would bring adverse publicity to the
corporation. Id.
107. Id. at 626, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
108. Id. at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
109. Id. at 633-34, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
110. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
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illegal payments to foreign officials. The shareholder also alleged
securities violations based on misleading proxy statements issued
by the corporation. The board appointed a special litigation com-
mittee of nondefendant directors. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that under Delaware law the business judgment rule
permits the good faith termination of derivative litigation by a
committee of independent directors."' In addition, the court found
that dismissal of the derivative suit would not conflict with federal
policy, because the harm to the corporation was the result of the
misuse and waste of corporate assets, ordinarily matters of state
law. 2 The misleading proxies, which are governed by federal se-
curities law, were not the cause of the harm."13 Accordingly, the
court dismissed the derivative suit.
1 4
Auerbach and Abbey held that state law permits an indepen-
dent committee of disinterested directors to terminate derivative
suits in the context of questionable foreign payments. Most cases
concerning the dismissal of derivative suits, however, arise in the
context of federal securities violations.
3. Federal Securities Violation-Breach of Fiduciary Duty Cases
Courts ruling on corporation motions to dismiss derivative
suits alleging federal securities violations" 5 have followed the
Burks v. Lasker two-step test."' For example, in Lewis v. Ander-
son 1 minority shareholders sued Walt Disney Productions and a
majority of the board for violating the federal securities laws." 8
The board appointed a special litigation committee to investigate
the lawsuit and to decide whether the corporation should continue
the derivative suit. The special litigation committee included two
recently appointed outside directors and a defendant director who
had acquiesced in the granting of the stock options."" After an ex-
111. Id. at 730.
112. Id. at 731-32.
113. Id. at 732.
114. Id.
115. For a discussion of federal securities policy in connection with the business judg-
ment dismissal of derivative litigation, see Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule as
Applied to Stockholder Proxy Derivative Suits Under the Securities Exchange Act, 8 SEc.
REG. L.J. 99 (1980).
116. See notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text.
117. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
118. Id. at 780. The shareholders claimed that a majority of the board violated federal
securities laws by granting certain stock options.




tensive investigation, the committee recommended dismissal of the
derivative suit on the basis that the suit was not in the best inter-
ests of the corporation, and the district court granted the mo-
tion. 12 0 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the litigation com-
mittee was unbiased notwithstanding the presence of a defendant-
director. The court held that the defendant-director was disinter-
ested Simply because he did not benefit from the stock options." 1
Applying the Burks test, the court found that under California
law, even when a majority of the board is named as defendants,122
the business judgment rule is applicable to a litigation committee's
decision to terminate a derivative suit. The court stated that
"Auerbach and Abbey reflect a clear trend in corporate law, and
we are confident that a California court would follow this trend." 2 '
After finding that California law would permit dismissal of the de-
rivative suit, the court concluded that dismissal would not frus-
trate federal policy.124 Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower
court's decision to dismiss the case.
125
The Second Circuit reached a different result on similar facts
in Galef v. Alexander.1 26 In Galef shareholders claimed that all of
the corporation's directors had breached their fiduciary duty to the
corporation and violated federal securities laws. The shareholders
alleged that the entire board allowed several directors to profit un-
fairly by granting stock options to certain officer-directors at an
unauthorized reduction in the exercise price.1 27 Plaintiff-sharehold-
ers named the remaining directors as defendants because of their
acquiescence in the transaction. 12  Also, the shareholders alleged
that the board violated the federal securities laws because of inad-
equate disclosure of the stock option plans in proxy statements is-
sued by the board.129 Following an investigation by outside coun-
sel, a majority of the board, with only those directors who did not
receive options voting, moved to dismiss the derivative suit.130 The
120. Id. at 780.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 781-83.
123. Id. at 783.
124. Id. at 783-84. For a criticism of the Lewis court's reasoning concerning the frus-
tration of federal policy question, see Block & Barton, supra note 115.
125. 615 F.2d at 784.
126. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
127. Id. at 53-54.
128. Id. at 54.
129. Id. at 55.
130. Id. at 56. Although the six board members who had received stock options were
excluded from voting, the potential for bias was arguably not significantly reduced because
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district court granted the corporation's motion to dismiss.131 On
appeal, the Second Circuit applied the two-step test from Burks v.
Lasker and reversed. 3 2 On the state law question, the court found
that although Ohio law was unclear, Ohio courts might apply the
business judgment rule to a decision by financially disinterested
defendant-directors to dismiss a derivative suit. 33 The Second Cir-
cuit remanded the case to the district court to ascertain whether
Ohio law permits financially disinterested defendant-directors to
terminate shareholder derivative suits under the business judg-
ment rule.134 Nevertheless, applying the second step of the Burks
test, the court held that even if Ohio law permits dismissal, federal
policy requiring full disclosure in proxy statements "would quite
clearly be frustrated" 13 5 if the defendant-directors were permitted
a business judgment dismissal of the derivative suit. The court,
however, noted that even though the federal claims could not be
dismissed, on remand partial summary judgment might be allowed
under Ohio law for the state claims.13 6
III. ZAPATA CORP. V. MALDONADO
A. The Facts137
In 1970 the board of directors of Zapata Corporation adopted
a stock option plan for certain of the company's officers and direc-
tors. The plan established a purchase price of $12.15 per share for
Zapata common stock and an exercise deadline of July 14, 1974. In
early 1974, however, Zapata was planning to announce a tender of-
fer for 2.3 million of its own shares prior to the final exercise date
of the stock options. The board expected the announcement to in-
crease the market price of Zapata stock from about eighteen dol-
lars per share to the tender offer price of twenty-five dollars per
share. Anticipating the tender offer announcement, Zapata's direc-
tors, most of whom were holders of the stock options, accelerated
the nine directors who did vote were all named as defendants in the derivative action. The
board's failure to create an independent litigation committee of new, outside directors may
be an important distinction between Galef and decisions that have allowed dismissal. See
notes 150, 196 & 205 infra and accompanying text.
131. 615 F.2d at 57.
132. Id. at 64.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 64 n.20.
135. Id. at 66-67.
136. Id. at 63-64.




the exercise date to July 2, 1974. On July 2 the insider-optionees
exercised their options,138 and on July 8 Zapata announced the
tender offer.
In June 1975 Maldonado, a Zapata shareholder, brought a de-
rivative action in the Delaware Court of Chancery against all of
Zapata's directors alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. Maldonado
also brought a derivative action in federal court against the same
defendants alleging both the breach of fiduciary duty and a viola-
tion of federal securities laws, particularly section 14(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.19 Since all the directors were
named as defendants 140 Maldonado was not required to make de-
mand1 41 on the corporation to sue. In addition; another share-
holder brought a similar derivative action in the Southern District
of Texas.
1 42
In 1979 the Zapata board created an "Independent Investiga-
tion Committee" composed of two recently appointed outside di-
rectors to investigate both of Maldonado's actions and the action
brought in Texas.' 43 The committee determined that continuation
of the lawsuits would be "inimical to the Company's best inter-
ests. ' 144 Consequently, Zapata filed a motion for dismissal or sum-
mary judgment in all three derivative actions.
145
B. Maldonado I
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York was the first court to rule on Zapata's motion to dismiss
138. Id. at 1254. Plaintiff-shareholders alleged that the acceleration of the exercise
date enabled the directors to avoid substantial additional federal income tax and accord-
ingly deprived the corporation of a tax deduction of a comparable amount. The insider-
optionees saved taxes because the amount of capital gain for federal income tax purposes
equals the difference between the option price and the market price on the exercise date of
the option. Since the options were exercised before the announcement of the tender offer,
the capital gain equaled approximately $6.35-the market price of $18.50 less the option
price of $12.15. If the options had been exercised after the tender offer announcement (with-
out the acceleration), the capital gain would have equaled about $12.85-the tender offer
price of $25 less the option price of $12.15. Defendants denied these allegations. Id. at 1255.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
140. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 780 (Del. 1981).
141. For a discussion of the requirement that a plaintiff make demand on the corpora-
tion to sue before instituting a derivative action, see notes 38-47 supra and accompanying
text.
142. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980).





the derivative suit.14 6 Applying the Burks v. Lasker guidelines, the
court first examined whether Delaware law permits independent
directors to compel the business judgment dismissal of derivative
suits against fellow directors. Recognizing that no Delaware court
had ruled on the matter, the district court, nevertheless, decided
that
under Delaware law a committee of disinterested directors, properly vested
with the power of the board, may in the exercise of their business judgment
require the termination of a derivative suit brought on the corporation's be-
half even though other directors are disqualified from participating in such a
decision because they are named as defendants in the suit.
147
After deciding that Delaware law would permit dismissal of
the action, the court examined whether dismissal would frustrate
federal policy. The court reasoned that business judgment dismis-
sal of the derivative suit "does not infringe directly upon the pro-
tections accorded investors by the regulatory scheme of section
14(a) . . . [because it] does not condone conduct violative of that
section. ' 14 8 Moreover, the court noted that dismissal of the deriva-
tive action would not preclude private enforcement of Maldonado's
claim, because even if the corporation did not bring suit Maldo-
nado could assert a section 14(a) claim either individually or as a
class action on behalf of all shareholders. 149 Finally, the court care-
fully distinguished Galef from the Maldonado situation. According
to the court, Galef was based on a determination that the directors
responsible for the decision not to terminate the suit were not dis-
interested. Furthermore, the Maldonado I court observed that
Galef had not addressed "whether a state rule permitting
nondefendant directors or an independent committee to initiate a




Two months after the federal court decision, the Delaware
Chancery Court denied Zapata's motion to dismiss.1 51 The chancel-
146. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
147. Id. at 279-80.
148. Id. at 281.
149. Id. By suggesting that shareholders could bring suits individually, the court failed
to take into account one of the major reasons for the derivative suit-the prevention of
multiple suits on essentially the same corporate cause of action.
150. Id. at 286 n.44.
151. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980). Nevertheless, the chancery
court subsequently dismissed Maldonado's derivative suit on the basis that the federal court
[Vol. 35:235
BUSINESS JUDGMENT DISMISSAL
lor found that the business judgment rule does not confer power on
a board or board committee to terminate a derivative suit.152 The
chancery court criticized the offensive use of the business judg-
ment rule:
[T]he business judgment rule is merely a presumption of propriety accorded
decisions of corporate directors. It provides a shield with which directors may
oppose stockholders' attacks on [their] decisions;. . but nothing in it grants
any independent power to a corporate board of directors to terminate a deriv-
ative suit. The authority to terminate a derivative suit must be found-if at
all-outside the rule. . . While the business judgment rule may protect the
Committee of Independent Directors of Zapata from personal liability if they
have made a good faith decision that this suit is not in the best interests of
Zapata, .... the business judgment rule is irrelevant to the question of
whether the Committee has the authority to compel the dismissal of this
suit.15'
Because derivative suits have a dual nature, the chancellor rea-
soned that a corporation does not have the authority to dismiss a
shareholder derivative suit. The chancellor found that a corpora-
tion controls the corporate cause of action but has no authority
over the individual cause of action.1" Once the corporation ex-
pressly or impliedly refuses to assert the corporate claim, the indi-
vidual right to maintain the suit "ripens"; the corporation "can no
longer control the destiny of [the] suit. . . and cannot compel the
dismissal' 155 of the derivative action.156
In Maher v. Zapata Corp.157 the federal district court in Texas
closely followed the Delaware Chancery Court's decision. Although
the Delaware Supreme Court had not addressed the issue, the dis-
trict court following the Burks approach, concluded, "Since Dela-
ware law does not permit independent directors to terminate a de-
rivative action against other board members, this Court need not
address whether. . . dismissal [of the derivative suit] is consistent
with the policies of the federal securities act. ... "158
decision was res judicata. Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980). The court,
however, expressly conditioned the dismissal on affirmance of the district court's decision by
the Second Circuit. Id. at 384. Later, the Second Circuit appeal was stayed pending the
ultimate decision by the Delaware Supreme Court. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779, 781 (Del. 1981).
152. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1262.
153. Id. at 1257 (citations omitted).
154. Id. at 1262.
155. Id.
156. See Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120, 126-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (specifically
rejecting the chancery court result).
157. 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980). The district court quoted extensively from the
Delaware Chancery Court's opinion.
158. Id. at 353.
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IV. THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT RULES: ZAPATA CORP. V.
MALDONADO' 5 9 .
As a result of the conflicting decisions concerning Maldonado's
derivative suit the Delaware Supreme Court faced a "procedural
gridlock."'160 First, the federal district court in New York dismissed
Maldonado's derivative suit, and he appealed to the Second Cir-
cuit. Second, the Delaware Chancery Court held that Zapata Cor-
poration could not dismiss the suit and the corporation appealed
to the Delaware Supreme Court. Third, in a subsequent opinion
the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed Maldonado's derivative
suit on the ground that the federal court's decision was res judi-
cata. However, the Chancery Court conditioned the dismissal on
subsequent affirmance by the Second Circuit. Last, the Second
Circuit appeal was stayed pending the decision by the Delaware
Supreme Court.
The Delaware court framed the issue narrowly-whether Dela-
ware law authorizes a directors' committee to cause a derivative
action to be dismissed. 161 Despite this limitation the court pro-
vided a lengthy analysis of the various issues contained in the case
and then presented a two-step test for determining whether to dis-
miss shareholder derivative suits. The court began its analysis by
agreeing with the chancery court that the business judgment rule
does not authorize corporate boards or their litigation committees
to dismiss derivative suits. Rather, the court found that the
board's authority, including the authority to dismiss shareholder
litigation, derives from section 141(a) of the Delaware Corporation
Laws.162 With the basis for the board's authority settled, the court
divided the case into three aspects: (1) Whether a shareholder has
a continuing right to maintain a derivative action; (2) whether a
duly authorized committee of directors has the power under Dela-
ware law to compel dismissal of a derivative suit; and (3) the role
the chancery court should perform "in resolving conflicts between
the stockholder and the committee."' 6
159. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
160. Id. at 781.
161. Id.
162. Id. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1980), provides that "[t]he business
and affairs of every corporation... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors . .. ."
163. 430 A.2d at 782.
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A. The Shareholder's Right to Maintain a Derivative Action
The Delaware .Supreme Court rejected the chancery court's
determination that once demand on the board is made and refused
a stockholder possesses an independent right to continue the deriv-
ative suit over the corporation's objection. The court found that
the stockholder's right to bring suit on behalf of the corporation is
not absolute.1 64 On the contrary, the court held that the corpora-
tion's decision not to sue terminates a shareholder derivative suit
unless the refusal was wrongful165 or demand on the board would
be futile. 6
B. The Power of the Independent Committee
The court then addressed the question whether an authorized
board committee may dismiss properly initiated shareholder deriv-
ative suits. Recognizing that "[e]ven when demand is excusable,
circumstances may arise when continuation of the litigation would
not be in the corporation's best interests,"''6 7 the court inquired
whether under such circumstances Delaware law would provide a
procedure with which a corporation could terminate derivative liti-
gation. The court stated its concern in this way:
If there is not [such a procedure], a single stockholder in an extreme case
might control the destiny of the entire corporation. . . . "To allow one share-
holder to incapacitate an entire board of directors merely by leveling charges
against them gives too much leverage to dissident shareholders." But, when
examining the means, including the committee mechanism .... potentials
for abuse must be recognized. 168
Nevertheless, because section 141(c) of the Delaware Corporation
Laws allows a board to delegate all of its authority to a committee,
the court found that an independent committee has the authority
of the corporation to move to dismiss a derivative suit.' 69 The
court found that the board never loses "its statutory managerial
authority"; 970 rather, when the board's decision not to sue is
wrongful, the courts will simply not respect that decision. Simi--
164. Id. See also Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120, 128-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
165. 430 A.2d at 784. For example, the board's decision is wrongful if it is made in
self-interest as a result of bias.
166. Id. Courts generally excuse the demand requirement in cases when demand
would be useless. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
167. 430 A.2d at 785.
168. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 869 (1980)); see notes 117-25 supra and accompanying text.




larly, the excusal of demand does not remove the board's author-
ity. The excusal "merely saves the plaintiff the expense and delay
of making a futile demand. 17 1 Hence, the court decided that the
actual question presented was whether a tainted board could dele-
gate its managerial authority to an independent committee-a
question of "membership disqualification, not the absence of
power in the board. ' 17 2 The court concluded that a board can le-
gally delegate its authority to a committee of disinterested direc-
tors even when a majority of the board is tainted by self-
interest.
1 7
C. A Role for the Trial Court: The Zapata Two-Step Test
Having established that an independent committee retains the
authority to move for dismissal of a derivative suit, the court then
attempted to balance the competing interests presented in share-
holder derivative actions.17 4 The court rejected the business judg-
ment rule approach, which other courts had used to resolve these
cases, 17 5 because of the risk of abuse inherent in a situation in
which directors must decide whether to expose fellow directors to
liability. 7 '
The court proposed a two-step test for courts to follow when
evaluating a corporation's motion to dismiss. First, the trial court
should evaluate the independence and good faith of the committee
and the reasonableness of its decision.1 77 The court placed the bur-
den of proof on the corporation to demonstrate the good faith, in-
dependence, and reasonableness of the committee.178 Second, if the
corporation passes the first step of the test, the trial court should
171. Id. at 786.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 786-87. The shareholders have an interest in preventing the board of direc-
tors from unfairly terminating shareholder derivative suits, and the corporation has an in-
terest in dismissing trivial and harmful litigation. See notes 74-75 supra and accompanying
text.
175. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
869 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
176. 430 A.2d at 787. The Zapata court noted that under the traditional business
judgment rule a court would review only the independence, good faith, and reasonable in-
vestigation of the committee. "The ultimate conclusion of the committee, under that view, is
not subject to judicial review." Id.
177. Id. at 788-89. The trial court may authorize discovery to assist it in its evaluation
of the committee's good faith and independence and the reasonableness of its decision. Id.
178. Id.
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apply its own business judgment to determine whether dismissal is
appropriate. 179 The Delaware court recognized that under its sec-
ond step situations might arise in which a corporation's motion for
dismissal would be denied even though the committee could estab-
lish its independence and the good faith and reasonableness of its
decision.1 80 Instead of limiting the chancery court's examination to
its own business judgment, the court added that the chancery
court should "give special consideration to matters of law and pub-
lic policy in addition to the corporation's best interests" 8 ' when
judging a corporation's motion to dismiss a shareholder derivative
suit. If the corporation satisfies both steps, the court may grant the
motion. The Delaware court remanded the case for further consid-
eration in light of the newly announced test.
1 82
V. ANALYSIS
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado the Delaware Supreme Court
recognized the need to balance adequately the competing interests
of the shareholder in maintaining a derivative action and the cor-
poration in dismissing detrimental litigation. It is questionable,
however, whether the court's two-step test adequately balances
those interests. This section of the Recent Development analyzes
179. Id. at 789.
180. Id. The Delaware court did not give an example of a situation in which dismissal
would be denied despite a showing of good faith, independence, and reasonableness. When a
corporation has passed this first step of the Zapata test, the court might still find dismissal
inappropriate in two types of cases. First, a court would deny dismissal if it found the com-
mittee's decision to be incorrect. In close cases the court might find that although the com-
mittee's decision was reasonable, the court disagrees and believes that it would be in the
best interests of the corporation to deny dismissal. This type of ruling is never appropriate.
The court should defer to the committee's business judgment and not intrude on the corpo-
ration's decisionmaking process by requiring it to conduct litigation that it believes to be
detrimental. See note 199 infra.
Second, a court would deny dismissal if, after giving "special consideration to matters
of law and public policy," 430 A.2d at 789, the court finds that the litigation should be
pursued. Perhaps a court would find that public policy outweighs the deleterious effects on
the corporation when the corporation's board of directors has committed a technical viola-
tion of the securities laws. Litigation of the matter might reasonably be concluded to be
more harmful to the corporation than the benefit to be received when the litigation fees and
the corporate embarrassment are weighed against the potential recovery. Nevertheless, the
court might conclude that public policy demands rigid enforcement of the law. This type of
judicial determination will almost always be inappropriate. A corporation is not likely to
vigorously pursue a claim it has determined is not in its best interests. See note 199 infra.
181. 430 A.2d at 789. The second step of the Zapata test is very similar to the second
step of the Burks test. Both require the court to examine "matters of law and public policy"
in addition to the corporation's best interests. See text following note 199 infra.
182. 430 A.2d at 789.
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the Delaware court's holding that the business judgment rule is not
applicable in determining whether the board of directors has the
authority to seek dismissal of shareholder derivative suits. This
section also examines both steps of the Zapata test and the effect
of the Zapata decision on future federal cases that apply Delaware
law.
Zapata correctly held that the business judgment rule is irrel-
evant in determining whether the board of directors has the power
to seek the dismissal of shareholder derivative suits.183 In most cir-
cumstances the rule becomes relevant only when a shareholder at-
tacks as improper the board's, or a board committee's, decision to
seek termination of the derivative lawsuit.8 4 By opposing the cor-
poration's motion to dismiss, the shareholder in Zapata did attack
the committee's decision as improper. Not only did Maldonado
challenge the committee's ultimate decision as incorrect, he also
claimed the committee's decision was wrongful by'asserting that
the litigation committee was not independent.18 5 Under similar
fact situations other courts have applied the business judgment
rule to decide whether to dismiss shareholder derivative suits."8 '
Nevertheless, the Delaware court was correct in not following the
Lewis, Auerbach, and Maldonado I line of cases, which dismissed
the shareholder's derivative suit on the basis of the business judg-
ment rule alone. The court properly concluded that the limited ju-
dicial review required by the business judgment rule would not
sufficiently safeguard against abuse when directors were passing
judgment on fellow directors.18 7 The court designed a two-part ju-
dicial review to provide the shareholder with necessary protection
while allowing the corporation to "rid itself of detrimental
litigation."
88
The first step of the test requires the trial court to examine
the independence, good faith, and reasonableness of the commit-
tee.189 Under the business judgment rule, prior courts had limited
their review to the issues of independence and good faith.190 While
183. The business judgment rule does not create authority in the board, but merely
insulates directors from personal liability for decisions made in good faith. See text accom-
panying notes 152-53 & 162 supra.
184. 430 A.2d at 782.
185. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980).
186. See text accompanying notes 60-67 & 76-150 supra.
187. 430 A.2d at 787.
188. Id. at 787.
189. Id. at 788.
190. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
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the business judgment rule usually places the burden of proving
these initial matters on the plaintiff, the Zapata court shifted the
burden of proof to the corporation. 91 While the shift of the burden
may, as one commentator has suggested,19 2 increase the time and
expense of litigation and further clog the court system, at least
three reasons support the shift of the burden of proof to the corpo-
ration. First, the corporation should have the burden of proof be-
cause it has better access to the relevant information.1 93 Second,
since dismissal of a derivative suit prevents a full hearing on the
merits, the corporation, as movant for dismissal, should bear the
burden of proving that a hearing on the merits of the shareholder's
claim is unnecessary.194 Last, to preserve the effectiveness of the
derivative suit as a regulatory mechanism, "director judgments
alone, no matter how independent, should not be decisive"1 95 in
terminating derivative suits. Thus, the court's decision to shift the
burden of proof to the corporation on the issues of good faith, in-
dependence, and reasonableness appears sound. However, as an ac-
count of the case noted, the Zapata court should have established
some guidelines that explain how the corporation can meet this
burden of proof. '96
The second step of the Zapata test requires the trial court to
apply its own business judgment to determine whether a corpora-
tion's motion to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit should be
granted. This step presents at least two problems for the courts.
First, the notion that the judiciary can competently make business
decisions for the corporation based on "'ethical, commercial, pro-
(1979). See also text accompanying notes 103-09 supra.
191. 430 A.2d at 788. The corporation now has the burden of persuasion to show that
the committee, in fact, decided to dismiss the suit independently, in good faith, and on
reasonable grounds.
192. According to one commentator, shifting the burden of proof to the corporation
will "require fairly extensive presentation of evidence . . . . cross-examination . . . . and
some independent review . . . on the merits by the judge. More work for lawyers. More
expense for corporations .... " Olson, supra note 10, at 19, cols. 2 & 3.
193. See Dent, supra note 13, at 133-34.
194. Id. at 134.
195. Olson, supra note 10, at 19, col. 3.
196. Hinsen & Dreizen, Delaware Court Addresses Business Judgment Rule, Legal
Times of Washington, June 8, 1981, at 18, col. 4. Ideally, the guidelines would establish
standards that corporations could strive to meet in appointing personnel to the litigation
committee. Also, the standards could provide methods of investigation to be used by a liti-
gation committee in its determination whether or not to dismiss the suit. To establish the
guidelines the courts could look at the performance of and techniques employed by other
litigation committees. In general, these committees have been very diligent in performing
their duties. See note 205 infra.
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motional, public relations, employee relations, [and] fiscal as well
as legal'" considerations 197 is open to question. Second, the power
given to the trial court to continue derivative litigation even
though the suit is actually detrimental to the corporation is espe-
cially troublesome. As the Delaware court stated,
This means, of course, that instances could arise where a committee can es-
tablish its independence and sound bases for its good faith decisions and still
have the corporation's motion denied .... The Court of Chancery should,
when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and public pol-
icy in addition to the corporation's best interests.198
On the basis of the preceding language, the trial court could "force
a corporation to litigate a novel issue, in circumstances that would
not serve its best interests."' 99
The second step of the Zapata test is unnecessary because the
first step satisfactorily balances the shareholder's interest in pre-
serving a meaningful remedy for corporate harms and the corpora-
tion's interest in dismissing detrimental litigation. Under the first
step the corporation must prove not only the good faith and inde-
pendence of the committee but also the reasonableness of the com-
mittee's decision to dismiss the derivative suit. This requirement
adequately accounts for the corporation's interest because the cor-
poration can rid itself of detrimental litigation by demonstrating a
reasonable basis for its decision not to continue the derivative suit.
In addition, the first step protects the shareholder's interest be-
cause the court will not dismiss the derivative suit unless it is con-
vinced that there is a sound basis for the board committee's deter-
mination that the suit is not in the best interests of the
corporation. Since the derivative suit is based on a corporate claim
and is brought on the corporation's behalf, the court has no reason
not to dismiss the derivative suit once it is convinced that the liti-
gation committee reasonably acted in good faith to seek the corpo-
ration's best interest. If, however, the court finds that the commit-
tee acted independently and in good faith, but that it did not
197. 430 A.2d at 788 (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y.
1980)).
198. Id. at 789.
199. Hinsen & Dreizen, supra note 196, at 19, col. 1. See note 180 supra. In an adver-
sary system it is unlikely that justice will be served by forcing a corporation to litigate an
issue when it does not stand to gain in the outcome. Since the suit has already been found
to be detrimental to the corporation even if it is successful, one cannot expect the corpora-
tion to vigorously pursue the matter. The situation is analogous to a case in which a party
must spend more in legal costs than what the legal claim is worth. Hence, the second step of




reasonably conclude that the derivative suit is detrimental to the
corporation, then the court will not dismiss the suit. Therefore, the
first step of the Zapata test sufficiently balances the competing in-
terests of the shareholder and the corporation.
Another interesting aspect of Zapata is the potential interplay
with the Burks v. Lasker test2 0 in federal courts. Under the Burks
test a federal court considering a corporation's motion to dismiss
must first determine whether the law of the state of incorporatiQn
permits dismissal. If dismissal is appropriate under state law the
federal court will grant the corporation's motion unless the dismis-
sal would conflict with federal policy. A federal court applying the
Burks test would, when confronted with a Delaware corporation's
motion for dismissal, begin its analysis with an examination of
whether Delaware law permits dismissal-the Zapata test.10 1 As-
suming that the corporation's board or litigation committee can
meet the good faith, independence, and reasonableness standard of
the first step of Zapata, the federal court would then apply its own
business judgment to determine whether dismissal should be
granted. At this second step of the Zapata test, Delaware law re-
quires the court to "give special consideration to matters of law
and public policy.1' 0 2 If, under this rather deferential standard, the
federal court finds that dismissal is inappropriate the court will
not dismiss the action. Even if the federal court finds no violation
of federal policy, it may still refuse to dismiss if it perceives that
Delaware public policy would somehow be thwarted. If, however,
dismissal is deemed appropriate under Delaware's "special consid-
eration" standard, the federal court then proceeds to the second
step of Burks-an examination of federal policy. The Burks policy
examination does not give as great a deference to the court as the
Zapata standard; Burks allows a court to refuse dismissal only if
the dismissal would conflict with federal policy.203
Before Zapata a federal court could refuse to dismiss a deriva-
tive action against a Delaware corporation only if federal policy
would be obstructed. Now, however, a federal court may deny dis-
missal much more freely; the court is no longer restricted to con-
siderations of federal policy alone, but may deny dismissal anytime
it determines that denial is justified on general grounds of law and
public policy. The Zapata court has thus implied that it will not
200. See notes 76-101 supra and accompanying text.
201. See text accompanying notes 177-82 supra.
202. 430 A.2d at 789.
203. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1979).
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place a strong emphasis on granting corporations incorporated in
its state freedom to dismiss derivative suits-even federal deriva-
tive suits not in the corporation's best interest. Zapata, however, is
unlikely to cause substantial problems for Delaware corporations
defending derivative suits in the federal courts. Rather, federal
courts probably will continue to conduct only one policy analysis
and to adhere to the strict Burks standard-a standard with which
the federal courts are familiar and one that is easy to apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Zapata court's method of balancing the shareholder's
right to maintain a derivative suit with the corporation's right to
terminate derivative litigation is basically sound. By adding the
second step-that the trial court should apply "its own indepen-
dent business judgment"2' 4 in determining whether the motion to
dismiss should be granted-the court may have unnecessarily over-
protected the shareholder. Although the court's test may favor the
shareholder, special litigation committees will reduce the corpora-
tion's disadvantage. One commentator has already noted that the
independent directors serving on the litigation committees have
been "setting high performance standards and meeting them."0 5
Perhaps the litigation committees, recognizing not only the
financial interests of the corporations, but also the corporation's
important role in modern society, should themselves consider pub-
204. 430 A.2d at 789.
205. See Estes, supra note 53, at 56. The committees have held themselves to high
performance standards in an attempt to increase their credibility in the eyes of the courts.
First, in most cases the directors selected have not participated in any inappropriate con-
duct. Second, the directors chosen tend to be individuals with impeccable credentials and
experience in handling complex problems. See text accompanying note 70 supra. Third, the
committees generally retain preeminent outside counsel. For instance, in Burks the commit-
tee retained former chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Stanley H. Fuld, as
special counsel. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1210 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471
(1979). Similarly, in Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the
litigation committee retained former Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Jo-
seph Weintraub, as special counsel. Last, the investigations have typically been diligent and
extensive. The committee members have obtained independent sources of information and
have actively participated in evaluations of both the data discovered and the involvement of
company personnel. Estes, supra note 53, at 52. The performance standards set by the liti-
gation committee in Abbey, see notes 110-14 supra and accompanying text, led the district
court to remark that "given the impeccable credentials of the committee members and the
thoroughness of their investigation, it would be impossible to establish bad faith or lack of
independence on the part of the committee." Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp.
1242, 1244 (D. Minn. 1978), af'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017
(1980).
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lic policy questions in determining whether the corporation should
pursue a derivative suit. The independent committee should func-
tion like a self-regulating arbitration board that resolves disputes
between shareholders and the board. Perhaps with a broader view
future boards may avoid courtroom conflicts with their
shareholders.
DAVID A. BEYER

